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Abstract
Intentional threats, which are also known as human-induced hazards including terrorism, have become a worldwide catastrophe 
risk since recent years. In order to protect city from intentional threats, the urban defense engineering has become an important 
part of urban planning and construction. Based on that, the security planning on urban infrastructure is required to be improved 
and corresponding security surveillance and early warning systems need to be enhanced. More importantly, the macro-level study 
of defense resource allocation should be given more considerations. In this study, a resource allocation model focusing on urban 
defense under the situation with intentional attacking is developed. In this resource allocation model, the rationality level of 
attackers, the interrelation among targets and other related problems under intentional attacks are all considered. Besides, this 
model is also validated by using an example, and in this example, the impact of several important parameters have been 
discussed. It is shown that the expected loss of the optimized resource allocation plan derived from this model is smaller than that 
of the population proportion-based allocation plan and average-based allocation plan. It also shows that the correlation coefficient 
of targets has a significant impact of the defense resource allocation. This model can provide the planners and decision makers of 
urban defense engineering with scientific basis for macroscopic decision making in responding to intentional threats.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Desheng Dash Wu
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1. Introduction
Recent years, intentional threats, like terrorism events and sabotages, occur more frequently, which have become 
a worldwide catastrophe risk. For example, the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks in the USA, the 3/11 Madrid Train Bombings 
in Spain, the Lhasa 3/14 vandalism and arson in China and the 1/24 Moscow Airport Bombing were all typical 
intentional attacks and led to huge losses and fatalities.
Unlike natural disasters, intentional attacks are induced by intentional attackers who usually select attacking 
targets and attacking strategies based on the situation of urban defense strategies and the type of urban defense 
resources, showing attackers’ decision rationality. Therefore, intentional attacks cannot be considered as simple 
random events. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a risk-based performance standard for 
security of chemical facilities in the United States, which has already been generally accepted currently. However, 
the rationality of attackers has not been considered among the process of risk assessment. 
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In fact, the targets in city are not independent, but interrelated to each other. Under the intentional threats, the 
interrelation among targets is necessary to be considered. Under the situation of interrelated targets, when defender 
strengthens the defense of one target, the possibility of being attacked of other targets will vary.
A series of researches have been conducted studying the problem of resource allocation under intentional threats. 
Based on game theory, Major [1] presented a two zero-sum game model which focus on how attackers and 
defenders receive benefits through allocation of defence resources. The model of Bier et al [2] takes into account 
both the success probability of an attack and the value of the target, which leads to the fact that attackers may choose 
the most vulnerable target rather than a target that would cause the highest expected damage. Major [1] and Woo [3] 
obtained a more realistic meaningful result which showed that the probability of the attacker choosing a particular 
target is inversely proportional to the marginal effectiveness of defense at that target. Hausken [4, 5] introduced 
game theory into the study on system reliability when analysing the problems of target selection, which provided an 
effective method of solving the problems of decision rationality and strategic interaction in the process of target 
selection. Golany et al [6] studied the feature of risk deflection, defined the probabilistic risk and the strategic risk 
and pointed out that the feature of risk is determined by the feature of emergency event.
In the process of unban defense from intentional threats, the resource should be allocated reasonably to every 
target in the city to minimize the expected loss. In this paper, the decision rationality of attackers and the 
interrelation of targets as well as other related factors are considered. We developed a resource allocation model for 
urban defense in situation with intentional threats, which can provide the planner and decision makers of urban 
defense engineering with scientific basis for macroscopic decision making in responding to intentional threats.
2. Model
The standard released by DHS estimates risks by using following formula [7]: 
                R T V C u u (1)
where R is risk of the emergency event. T is threat which represents the occurrence possibility of the emergency
event. V is vulnerability which represents the conditional probability that the event leads to a loss under the 
condition that this event has occurred. Generally, V also can be understood as the success probability of an attack. C
is consequence which represents the outcome of an event occurrence, including immediate, short- and long-term, 
direct and indirect losses and effects.
However, attackers have decision rationality so that they are able to make choices based on the defending 
strategies. In fact, many types of defense strategies are public information, or the information which can easily be 
observed. Therefore, the threat T is not a simple random independent factor, but closely related to the defense force 
deployment, the value of targets, the interrelation of targets and even the degree of rationality of attackers and so on,
which should be carefully considered during the modeling process.
2.1. Basic model
The purpose of attacking under the situation of intentional threats is to make the maximum casualties, economic 
losses, social impacts and other negative consequences.
The agents’ estimation basis for assessing the benefits and the consequence C of the event may differ, since it is 
related to their subjective motives. Based on that, the same event may bring different level of benefits according to 
the agents’ different benefits assessment. For example, when the attackers intend to cause casualties, the casualties 
will bring more benefits to them than other factors like social influences. Generally, the agents’ estimation basis for 
assessing the benefits and the consequence C of the event is closely related to regional GDP, population, and the 
number of critical Infrastructure. 
However, the consequence C of the event is not the only basis for decision making of attackers. The events with 
intentional threats have the feature of risk deflection, which means attackers can adjust their targets to find the best 
strategy which can balance costs and benefits well. And that strategy may not be consistent with investment focus of 
defenders. Attackers can choose the target with weak defense to avoid high risk. In order to reduce the risk, attackers 
are likely to give up high-value targets and choose the high-vulnerability target considering the success rate. 
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Therefore, in the study of risk analysis and resource allocation, the success probability for the attack is essential to 
be considered.
The function of the success probability of an attack usually has two types of expression: proportional [8, 9] and 
exponential [10]. The research on the system reliability by Hausken [11] indicated that the proportional function can 
express the opposability more clearly. In this paper the proportional function will be used to describe the success 
probability of an attack. The targets are considered to be independent. The success probability Vi of the attack on 
target i is: 
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where Ȧ is the attacking intensity which represents the attacking power of the attackers, xi is the resources 
allocated to the target i which represents the defending intensity of target i. The total resources are limited, so we 
assume that the total resources of the city are X, which satisfies the following constraints:
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where n is the quantity of the targets.
m represents the intensity of the contest. When m=0, xi and ȦKDYHWKHVDPHLPSDFWRQVi. When 0 < m< 1, 
it gives a disproportional advantage of intensity less than one’s opponent. When m = 1, xi and ȦKDYHSURSRUWLRQDO
impact on Vi. When m >1, it gives a disproportional advantage of intensity more than one’s opponent. Finally, m =
Ğ gives a step function where “winner-takes-all” [12]. Generally, the value of m is lower for systems which are 
difficult to attack and higher for those that are easy to attack [13]. For a general system, m>1 is the appropriate value
[4].
Attackers’ benefits can be understood as the expected loss E (L) for the event. Assume that the attacker 
concentrates on one target to attack, then the expected loss E (L) should be:
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As the attackers' purpose is to cause the greatest possible loss, so it is reasonable to consider that attackers set the
expected loss E (L) as a basis for decision making. On the contrary, the defenders’ purpose is to minimize the 
expected loss. 
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It can be easily proved that when the defender has Ed (L), for any target i, V • C are equal. 
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Based on the above steps, we can obtain the optimization of the defense resource allocation under the situation of 
intentional threats.
2.2. Resource allocation model under the situation of interrelated targetsǄ
The interrelation among the targets can be interpreted as:
Ь The resources allocation on one target not only affects its own defense capability, but also affects the defense 
capability of other targets interrelated to it;
Ь The outcome of attack on one target may transfer to other targets interrelated to it.
Under the situation of interrelated targets, the success probability Vi of the attack on target i is: 
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where ȕji is the correlation coefficient between the target j and i. When jL, 0  ȕ ji  ; when j=i, ȕji = 1. 
Correlation coefficient indicates the degree of difficulty that the intentional threats are transferred from target j to 
target i, and the impact caused by the resources assigned to target j on the defence capability of target i. The greater 
the correlation coefficient is, the more easily the intentional threat can be transferred from target j to target i, and the 
more impact caused by the changing of target j’s defense capability is received by target i. 
Therefore, the attacker and the defender's expected loss E (L) can be expressed as:
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2.3. Resource allocation model under the assumption of bounded rationality
The resource allocation model in 2.1 and 2.2 is based on the assumption of perfect rationality, which assumes that 
the rational agents will always take the actions which targets on maximizing their benefits. In the perfect rationality 
model, attackers will choose the target whose product of consequences C and attack success probability V is the 
largest. However, in the actual intentional threats scenarios, the attackers often don’t follow the perfect rational 
assumption, but follow the assumption of bounded rationality. Under the limitation of the rationality level, the 
attacker may not choose the target with the greatest expected benefit.
Based on the bounded rationality model of Luce (1959) [14], the urban defense resource allocation model is 
improved as:
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where Pi is the probability that attacker selects target i in the set of targets. According to Luce’s view [14], Pi can 
be represented in the following form:
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where q  0, and it represents the rationality level of the attacker. When q=0, the attacker is considered with no 
rationality. When Pi=1/n, the possibility of attacks on any target is the same and the event under the situation of 
intentional threats can be seen as random event. When qĺ, Pi increases monotonically with q, and tends to 1. In 
this case, equation (10) has the same result with equation (5), and we consider that the attacker has perfect
rationality.
Of course, the rationality level is a highly abstract concept and the above model is a theoretical model. The 
definition and analysis of the rationality level remains to be studied in the further research.
3. Example
In order to validate the model, an example below is provided by using the data of population density of a city.
Table 1 shows the data of population density of the city (2007).
Parameters: the total resources of the city X = 500; attacking intensity Ȧ = 5; intensity of the contest m = 2; set 
the regional population density as the consequences C.
Example1: Without considering the situation of interrelated targets, compare the expected loss E (L) of the 
optimized resource allocation, the population proportion-based allocation and the average-based allocation.
This is a nonlinear programming problem. We use lingo11.0 to solve this problem. The results are shown in 
Table 2 and figure 2.
Table 1. Population density of the city
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region
population 
density(1/km2)
region
population 
density(1/km2)
A 24,393 J 384
B 24,467 K 710
C 20,386 L 557
D 28,271 M 375
E 3,935 N 562
F 3,329 O 130
G 4,194 P 417
H 4,766 Q 193
I 166 R 140
Fig. 1. Figure of the population density of the city
Table 2. Comparison of urban defense resource allocation
region population 
density(1/km2)
average-
based 
allocation 
xi/X (%)
population 
proportion-
based
allocation
xi/X (%)
optimized 
allocation
xi/X (%)
A 24,393 5.56 20.78 15.30
B 24,467 5.56 20.84 15.32
C 20,386 5.56 17.37 13.98
D 28,271 5.56 24.09 16.47
E 3,935 5.56 3.36 6.08
F 3,329 5.56 2.84 5.57
G 4,194 5.56 3.57 6.28
H 4,766 5.56 4.06 6.70
I 166 5.56 0.14 0.77
J 384 5.56 0.33 1.64
K 710 5.56 0.60 2.42
L 557 5.56 0.47 2.09
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M 375 5.56 0.32 1.62
N 562 5.56 0.48 2.10
O 130 5.56 0.11 0.50
P 417 5.56 0.36 1.74
Q 193 5.56 0.16 0.93
R 140 5.56 0.12 0.59
E(L) - 887.21 519.85 103.79
Fig. 2. Figure of Comparison of the expected loss E (L) of urban defense resource allocation
It is shown that the expected loss E (L) of the optimized resource allocation plan derived from this model is 
smaller than that of the population proportion-based allocation plan or average-based allocation plan. It also shows 
that the expected loss E (L) of the optimized resource allocation is smaller than any target’s consequence Ci of the 
event, which is also consistent with our common sense.
Fig. 3. (a) The impact of total resources on the optimized resource allocation; (b) The impact of total resources on the expected loss
The total resources of the city X and the attacking intensity Ȧ will impact the results of resource allocation. As
shown in figure 3(a), with increasing UDWLRRI;DQGȦ, the resources allocated to A or F decrease while the resources 
allocated to M increase. When the UDWLRRI;DQGȦ is large enough, the resources allocated to the target A, C or M 
will converge to their new allocation results respectively, and the overall resource allocation plan tends to be more 
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average. As shown in figure 3(b), the expected loss E (L) decreases with increasing UDWLRRI;DQGȦ. The larger the 
ratio of X and Ȧ is, the smaller the expected loss is.
The model has constraint on the relationship between the total resources of the city X and the attacking intensity 
Ȧ. When the ratio of X DQGȦ LV too small, the total resources X are insufficient to protect all targets, the limited 
resources should be allocated to the targets which are more important. So it is necessary to identify and prioritize the 
important targets.
Example2: We use the same data to study the resource allocation plan under the situation of interrelated targets. 
Parameter settings are the same with that in Example1. The interrelation among targets is shown in figure 4.
Fig. 4. Figure of the interrelation among targets
Table 3 compares the optimized defense resource allocation plans under different correlation coefficient. The 
result shows that the impact of interrelation among targets on optimized defense resource allocation plans increases 
with the correlation coefficient.
Table 3. Comparison of the optimized defense resource allocation plans under different correlation coefficient
region ȕ=0 ȕ=0.1 ȕ=0.2 ȕ=0.5 ȕ=0.8 ȕ=1
A 83.12 76.87 70.94 64.36 64.04 63.72
B 83.25 81.17 76.65 68.94 64.84 63.78
C 75.96 75.25 71.55 68.16 65.17 64.63
D 89.51 82.59 78.61 72.34 71.19 70.66
E 33.07 41.22 47.66 51.71 52.14 52.21
F 30.35 46.94 51.54 57.97 61.12 61.89
G 34.16 26.38 22.45 18.79 19.79 20.29
H 36.46 35.98 41.36 48.46 49.74 49.82
J 9.17 11.58 14.51 18.82 19.84 20.22
K 13.29 9.794 10.04 11.58 12.23 12.50
N 11.60 12.19 14.65 18.82 19.84 20.23
E(L) 87.94 158.06 218.04 388.36 555.07 664.96
Figure 5(a) compares the optimized defense resource allocation plans of targets A, C and F by using different 
correlation coefficients. When ȕ =0, A, C and F are independent. F has the minimum attractiveness to the attacker, 
so the least resources are allocated to F. As the interrelationship among F, A and C is increasing, the attacking effect 
on F of the attacker and the defense effect on F of the defender will have more and more impact on A or C. When ȕ
=1, F, A and C interrelate with each other absolutely.
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Meanwhile, the correlation coefficient will also impact the expected loss E (L) of the event.  As shown in figure
5(b), the expected loss increases with the correlation coefficient, because the interrelationship among targets will 
lead to an increase of the risk which is produced by all these interrelated targets.
Fig. 5. (a) The impact of the correlation coefficient on resource allocation; (b) The impact of the correlation coefficient on the expected loss
4. Conclusion
In this study, we develop a resource allocation model focusing on urban defense under the situation with 
intentional attacking. In this model, the situation of interrelated targets and the assumption of bounded rationality are 
also considered. This model can provide the planners and decision makers with scientific basis for macroscopic 
decision making in responding to intentional threats in urban defense engineering work. 
This model is validated by using an example, in this example, the impact of several important parameters has
been discussed. The result is showed as below:
Ь The optimized allocation plan can reduce the expected loss of the event with intentional threats. The expected loss 
in the optimized allocation plan derived from the results calculated according to this model is smaller than that of 
the population proportion-based allocation plan or average-based allocation plan. 
Ь When the ratio of total resources and the attacking intensity is large enough, the resources allocated to all targets 
will converge to their new allocation results respectively, and the overall resource allocation plan tends to be more 
average. When the ratio of total resources and the attacking intensity is too small, we cannot find the optimized 
result, since the total resources are insufficient to protect all targets. The limited resources should be allocated to the
targets which are more important. So it is necessary to identify and prioritize the important targets.
Ь The impact of interrelationship among targets on the optimized defense resource allocation plans increases with 
the correlation coefficient. This result is also consistent with our common sense. 
The study under the assumption of bounded rationality is still in the stage of theoretical exploration. More deep 
research remains to be studied in further.
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